What is the state of British government? What do we wish it to become? These questions lurk within my article on "The Westminster Model, Governance, and Judicial Reform". The philosopher J. L. Austin once said that he had been too busy doing what he was doing to explain why it mattered. I am grateful to Roger Masterman for impetus to explain why my article matters. My conciliatory personality will suggest that he and I broadly agree on the nature of juridification and its place in Labour's reforms. So, what is all the fuss is about? Well, even if we largely agree on juridification, we point to very different answers to questions about the state of British government and what we would like it to become. My confrontational personality will devote most of my reply to these issues. I believe British government resembles the differentiated polity of the governance narrative more than it does the Westminster Model. And I believe we should be looking to strengthen democracy through participatory institutions as well as representative ones.
Juridification
Masterman accepts my main argument about juridification: the sphere of influence of the judiciary has grown in recent constitutional history. Yet, this agreement may be hidden by his use of sentences with a particular structure. One example appears in his abstract: "while the contemporary constitution may have seen an increased degree of 'juridification' of the sort described by Bevir, the strengthening and development of political mechanisms of accountability has also been of considerable importance." A later example refers to the crucial case of the Human Rights Act: "assertive and creative 3 judicial interpretations have been deployed in adjudication under the Human Rights Act, yet it has been a recurring feature of litigation under the Act that the higher courts have been reluctant to act in a way which would overtly usurp the legislative function." He uses this type of sentence right through to the end: "while a degree of 'juridification' may be perceived in the development of the constitution, the codification of legal right and expansion of the judicial review jurisdiction may also be defended as integral to the rule of law." All these sentences juxtapose two claims. Such juxtaposition may suggest the two claims are in tension, but a moment's thought shows they are not. The first claims paraphrase arguments I made in my paper, and Masterman acknowledges some truth to them. The second claims are ones he wants to make, and I am willing to acknowledge some truth in them.
So, Masterman and I are telling compatible stories with different emphasises. Far from insisting that parliamentary sovereignty is the monolithic principle propounded by Dicey, I clearly argue that Dicey's image of the constitution was always inaccurate and has become increasingly inaccurate. It has become increasingly inaccurate because of, for example, the growth of judicial review, the growing power of the executive, and changes in the management and delivery of public services. These changes, most notably judicial review, have contributed to a process of juridification. The judiciary now plays a greater role in formulating and regulating legal standards, so the range of decisions that can be made democratically has necessarily been reduced. Labour's reforms include aspects of such juridification. reforms included measures that make the judiciary accountable to elected politicians. Yet again, I agree, especially if we are discussing legal norms. Otherwise I worry that the actual processes of accountability will, as so often, prove rather weak.
Governance
The disagreement between Masterman and I is not, it seems, about juridification. Westminster Model provides neither an adequate account of British political processes nor a useful normative guide to how to reform those processes.
Democracy
The extent to which the new governance undermines the Westminster Model is a question of degree. Loosely speaking, the more one believes it does, the more one will worry about the state of British democracy. I worry about it. Representative democracy is often a thin veneer covering rule through networks of unelected officials and experts.
We need to supplement representative institutions with a robust, participatory democracy, including more dialogic forms of policy-making. Masterman is more sanguine about the adequacy of representative institutions: he may sympathise with devolution as a way of bringing representative institutions closer to citizens, but he shows little interest in more direct forms of participation.
I worry that new theories and worlds of governance reveal and pose serious problems for Britain's representative democracy. Among the problems are those tied to the way juridification reduces the scope of decisions that can be made democratically. It is important to emphasise here that I claimed only that juridification restricts the space for future democratic decisions, not that it destroys it. Masterman over-states his case when he implies I believe handing an issue to the courts precludes later democratic decisions on that issue. My point is only that when Parliament hands the application of a rule to the courts, it necessarily -to use the word I use and he quotes me as using -"constrains" the space for democracy. It is also important to emphasise that I did not argue that the courts should have no role in public life. The courts main role remains that of interpreting and applying the law, and the rule of law requires that citizens can appeal to courts when public authorities go beyond their powers.
Masterman and I may agree that juridification restricts without eliminating the scope of later democratic decision-making, but we seem to disagree profoundly over the 
